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OUTLAWING PENSION-FUNDING 
SHORTFALLS 
Eric D. Chason* 
Before ERISA, employees faced a large risk that their employers 
would default or renege on pension obligations. By creating a federal 
guarantor of pensions (the PBGC), ERISA has greatly reduced this 
risk. All else being equal, low-risk pensions are worth more to 
employees but cost more to provide. Congress has never had a 
coherent policy on who should pay for these extra costs. Moreover, 
legal scholars have failed to create a theoretical framework for dealing 
with these costs, focusing instead on the supposed "moral hazard" that 
the PBGC guaranty creates. This Article inserts itself into the scholarly 
vacuum, asserting that employers should bear the full cost of providing 
low-risk pensions to their employees. 
The onlypracticable way to force employers to bear these costs is 
by requiring pension plans to be fully funded. Current law, however, 
tolerates persistent pension-funding shortfalls with a set of accounting 
conventions that allow employers to defer and spread funding 
obligations over several years. Only the powerful tax incentives of the 
Internal Revenue Code have the potential to draw employers to full 
funding. Unprofitable employers, however, will not respond to these 
incentives, choosing instead the subsidized guaranty offered by the 
PBGC. Because the PBGC guaranty is essentially a guaranty of 
corporate debt, the subsidized guaranty distorts the efficiency of capital 
markets. Outlawing pension-funding shortfalls would eliminate these 
subsidies. 
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I. lNTRODUCfiON 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 
(ERISA) relies on two methods to secure payment of pension 
benefits. Employers must set funds aside in trust. They must also buy 
insurance from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 
' Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). 
2007] Outlawing Pension-Funding Shortfalls 521 
Yet, the current system has produced large deficits for the PBGC and 
high-profile failures of pension plans. These problems prompted 
Congress to overhaul the system of pension funding with the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 (PP A 2006).2 
PP A 2006 may reduce, but will not solve, the problems of pension 
funding and insurance. The funding and insurance rules have been, 
and will remain, incoherent without further reform, for Congress has 
never had a coherent policy in mind when drafting them. 
Policymakers and scholars often assume that pension-funding rules 
should balance the interests of different constituents.3 Retirees want 
their pension benefits to be secure. Current employees want security 
as well, but also the opportunity to earn more benefits in the future. 
Employers want flexibility over plan contributions and low PBGC 
premiums. Taxpayers, if they pay attention at all, want to avoid, or at 
least mitigate, any bailout of the PBGC. Because these interests are 
irreconcilable, Congress has been responding to cacophony. The 
result is a broken system of pension funding and insurance.4 
This Article does not seek to rebalance the interests of different 
political groups. Instead, it tries to identify and justify the goals that 
pension-funding rules should - and can actually - achieve. It then 
tries to sketch a system of pension funding and insurance that would 
satisfy these goals. 
The first goal is the risk-minimization goal. It holds that 
employees should bear little or no risk that employers will default on 
pension obligations. Without pension regulation, employees face 
significant default risk. Their employer could file for bankruptcy or 
even change its mind about the payment of benefits. To a large 
extent, ERISA satisfies the risk-minimization goal with its system of 
benefit vesting, PBGC insurance, and plan funding. 
The second goal is the employer-internalization goal. It holds that 
employers should bear the cost of achieving the risk-minimization 
goal. It applies to employers individually and does not require strong 
2 Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). 
3 Cf, e.g., Kathryn J. Kennedy, Pension Funding Reform: It's Time to Get the 
Rules Right (Part 2) , 108 TAX NoTES 1039, 1041 (2005) (stating that "a balanced 
pension reform cannot be accomplished without compromises" and listing ten 
"factors (that] should be utilized in critiquing any reform"). 
4 For an excellent and detailed description, see Kathryn J . Kennedy, Pension 
Funding Reform: It's Time to Get the Rules Right (Part 1), 108 TAX NOTES 907 (2005). 
For a brief overview of legislation up to 2003, see Jeremy Gold, Stopping the Insanity 
in Pension Funding, CONTINGENCIES, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 34. 
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employers to protect the employees of weak employers. The current 
system allows persistent plan underfunding and charges a scanty 
premium for PBGC insurance. Congress has failed the employer-
internalization goal. Even PP A 2006, arguably the most significant 
revision of pension law since ERISA was passed, will let underfunding 
continue. Thus, financially weak employers can continue to shift 
some of their pension costs to financially strong employers. 
Taxpayers still face the risk of bearing these costs in the future. 
Two practices have plagued pension funding since the passage of 
ERISA. One is amortization of losses. Rather than forcing 
employers to make up funding shortfalls on a yearly basis, ERISA 
allows employers to defer shortfalls for years. The other practice is 
"smoothing." Rather than forcing employers to value assets and 
liabilities at current market values, ERISA allows employers to use 
historical averages. Amortization and smoothing both mask financial 
risk. Nevertheless, financial-market volatility is often what creates 
funding shortfalls. 5 These shortfalls are breaches that may widen, not 
aberrations that should be wished away. Someone must bear the costs 
of funding shortfalls. The employer-internalization goal places them 
upon the employer. 
To satisfy the two goals, this Article proposes a system of full 
funding of pension obligations. Full funding would end amortization 
and smoothing. It would also minimize the role of PBGC insurance, 
which is needed only if there are funding shortfalls. Even under the 
proposal, PBGC insurance would still be needed. However, it would 
protect only against short-term financial volatility and against 
differences between estimated and actual plan liabilities. 
Part II of this Article describes the risk-minimization goal. This 
goal is uncontroversial, but its implementation increases the expense 
of pension obligations. Thus, the goal affects the employer-
internalization goal, described in Part III. Part III also describes how 
tax deductions for contributions lure only financially strong employers 
into funding their plans. By charging all employers for coverage that 
benefits only the weak, the PBGC effectively subsidizes the pension 
plans of financially weak employers. Indeed, the value of the subsidy 
grows as financial strength weakens. Part IV sketches a system of full 
funding that would implement the employer-internalization goal for 
all employers, weak and strong. Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
5 See Lawrence N. Bader & Jeremy Gold, Reinventing Pension Actuarial 
Science, THE PENSION FORUM, Jan. 2003, at 1, 12 ("Volatility is a property of markets; 
it is not a disease for which accounting is the cure."). 
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II. RISK-MINIMIZATION GOAL 
A. The Purpose of ERISA 
Risk minimization is central to ERISA. Prior to the passage of 
ERISA in 1974, prefunding of pension obligations was almost wholly 
discretionary on the part of the employer.6 The lack of collateral 
exposed employees to the risk of default if the employer went 
bankrupt or terminated the plan. This risk became reality in 1963 
when Studebaker Corporation closed its South Bend, Indiana, 
manufacturing plant. The plant shutdown led to Studebaker's 
termination of its underfunded, union-negotiated pension plan. The 
plan had enough assets to pay full benefits to those who had already 
reached age sixty. After satisfying the claims of the sixty-and-over 
workers, the plan had few assets to satisfy the claims of younger 
workers. Some received benefits worth about 15% of the face value 
of their claims. Some received nothing at all. The Studebaker 
incident was a sensation, leading to Congressional hearings and media 
scrutiny of pension funding. Even though Congress waited another 
eleven years to pass ERISA, the Studebaker incident remained vivid 
in the minds of policy makers and is recognized as a catalyst for the 
7 passage of ERISA. 
Mandatory prefunding of pension obligations is the first defense 
against employer default.8 All pension plans must have assets held in 
trust, pursuant to a written instrument.9 The trust subjects plan 
administrators to fiduciary duties. ERISA clarifies these duties by 
directing the fiduciary to hold assets for the exclusive benefit of the 
employees.1° Calculating the amount that employers must contribute 
to their plans is the subject of Part III.C. 
ERISA also regulates default risk by mandating vesting. 
Therefore, a plan cannot condition benefits on the financial health of 
6 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT LAw 355 (3d ed. 2000). An employer that stopped funding a plan might 
cause all benefits in the plan to vest - but only to the extent the plan was already 
funded. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.401-6(a) (1963); see also Treas. Reg.§ 1.401-6(c) (1963) 
(describing the types of funding failures that would trigger vesting). 
7 For a more comprehensive treatment of the Studebaker incident, see James 
A. Wooten,o''The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The Studebaker-
Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001). 
8 See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 910-11. 
9 See ERISA§§ 402(a), 403(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a), 1103(a) (2006). 
10 ERISA§ 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006). 
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the employer or on service beyond five or seven years (depending on 
the schedule chosen).11 The protection of vesting also includes 
protection against plan amendments that would cut back previously 
earned benefits. 12 
In summary, funding, fiduciary regulation, and vesting are at the 
core of ERISA and implement the risk-minimization goal. Because 
those elements only partially implement the risk-minimization goal, 
Congress created a system of pension insurance to guaranty payment 
of pension benefits. This guaranty is discussed in the next Part. 
B. Government Guaranty against Default 
ERISA created the PBGC to guaranty the payment of most 
private, defined-benefit pension benefits. 13 The guaranty protects 
employees against the risk of default when an employer terminates its 
pension plan. The guaranty does not directly benefit employers, who 
are responsible for funding plan shortfalls unless their plans are 
terminated (typically in bankruptcy or liquidation).14 The indirect 
benefits of the guaranty to the employer are the subject of Part III.E. 
ERISA caps the level of guarantied benefits.15 For plans 
terminating in 2006, the cap is a yearly benefit, starting at age sixty-
five, of $47,659.16 The cap is reduced if the employee elects a form of 
payment different from a single-life annuity starting at age sixty-five.17 
Often, reductions reflect the early start of payments before age sixty-
11 See I.R.C. § 41l(a). 
12 See I.R.C. § 41l(d)(6). 
13 The guaranty does not extend to defined contribution plans (such as 401(k), 
403(b), 457 plans, and ESOPs); very small plans with twenty-five or fewer active 
participants; plans maintained for a select group of management or highly 
compensated employees; governmental plans; church plans; and welfare plans, such as 
retiree medical plans. See ERISA § 4021(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a), (b) (2006) 
(describing inclusions and exclusions from coverage). 
14 See discussion infra Part III.B (comparing pension obligations with debt 
obligations). 
15 See ERISA§ 4022,29 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006). 
16 See Press Release, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., PBGC Announces 
Maximum Insurance Benefit for 2006 (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.pbgc.gov/media/ 
news-archive/2005/pr06-09.html. The cap applies to all pensions of any one person. 
Thus, if someone is a participant in two failed plans, a single cap still applies; the cap 
is determined at the time of the last plan termination affecting the participant. See 
ERISA§ 4022B, 29 U.S.C. § 1322b (2006); 29 C.F.R. pt. 4022B.l(a) (2006). 
17 See ERISA § 4022(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (2006) (referring to the 
"actuarial value of a monthly benefit in the form of a life annuity commencing at age 
(sixty-five]"). 
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five or the value of survivor benefits (e.g., a 50% survivor annuity for 
a spouse). 
The guarantied amounts are well below the largest benefits that a 
pension plan can provide under the tax laws. For 2006, the largest 
amount allowed is a yearly benefit of $175,000.18 Because very few 
employees approach this amount, 19 the PBGC cap will cover most 
pension benefits payable to employees.20 
When a plan fails, employees have claims against the PBGC and 
remaining plan assets. The allocation of plan assets is, however, 
inconsistent with the PBGC guaranty. Regardless of the size of their 
benefits, employees who started (or could have started) receiving 
benefits three or more years before termination have the highest 
priority claim against plan assets. 21 Such employees might continue to 
receive full benefits above the cap, even if the PBGC must step in to 
pay the benefits of other employees.22 
When underfunded plans terminate and trigger the PBGC 
guaranty, the PBGC receives the assets of terminated plans. The 
PBGC needs other assets to pay for the shortfall. To do this, the 
PBGC collects annual premiums.23 An annual, flat fee of $30 per 
covered employee applies to every single-employer plan covered by 
the PBGC guaranty program.24 The $30 fee is fixed. It applies 
regardless of the funding quality of the plan, the financial well being 
18 See I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (establishing $160,000 cap); I.R.C. § 415(d) (subjecting 
the cap to cost-of-living increases); I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-120 (Oct. 14, 2005) 
(stating that the year 2006 cap is $175,000). 
19 Consider a rather rich formula that pays benefits equal to 1.5% percent of 
compensation times years of service. If a participant had thirty years of service, he 
would not reach the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) cap unless his 
compensation was $105,909 or more. The Internal Revenue Code (Code) places a 
cap of $220,000 on compensation that can be used to calculate pension benefits. See 
I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (establishing a $200,000 cap on compensation subject to cost-of-
living increases); I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-120 (Oct. 14, 2005) (stating that the 
year 2006 cap is $220,000). If a participant had $220,000 or more of compensation, he 
would not reach the PBGC cap unless he had fifteen or more years of service. 
Therefore, for participants commencing benefits at age sixty-five, the PBGC cap is 
relevant only to well-paid, long-service employees. 
20 See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 901. 
21 See ERISA § 4044(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (2006). I am assuming that 
the plan did not contain employee contributions. Cf ERISA § 4044(a)(1), (2), 29 
U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1), (2) (2006) (giving highest priority to employee contributions). 
22 See ERISA§ 4044(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (2006). 
z.
1 See ERISA § 4005, 29 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006); DAN MCGILL ET AL., 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 815 (8th ed. 2005). 
24 See ERISA§ 4006(a)(3)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006). 
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of the employer, or even the amount of benefits promised to 
employees. 
The PBGC also collects another fee, called the "variable-rate 
premium," from some underfunded plans. The variable-rate premium 
is equal to 0.9% of the plan's underfunded amount, calculated on an 
annual basis.25 Yet, the 0.9% premium is inadequate because it is less 
than the default premiums demanded by corporate bond markets. 
Data on corporate bonds for the week ending January 13, 2006 are 
shown below:26 
TABLE I. 
U.S. Treasury bond, 10-year constant maturity 4.41% 
U.S. Treasury bond, 20-vear constant maturity 4.65% 
Moody's Seasoned Aaa Index 5.29% 
Moody's Seasoned Baa Index 6.24% 
For the best credit risks, the 0.9% default premium could be 
appropriate. For the Baa grade and below, it clearly fails. Because 
the worst credit risks have the highest likelihood of paying the 
variable rate premium, the 0.9% fee is too small. 
In recent years, the most prominent plan failures have been of 
airlines and steel manufacturers in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Starting in 
2006, ERISA imposes a surcharge on employers that terminate 
underfunded plans in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The annual surcharge is 
$1250 per participant for the three years after plan termination. 27 
ERISA imposes no duty on the federal government to maintain 
the PBGC's solvency.28 If the PBGC ever goes insolvent, retirees 
might find their benefits cut, even though the PBGC guarantied them. 
After all, a guaranty is only as good as the guarantor. Many observers 
think Congress would bail out the PBGC and its covered employees in 
the event of failure, much as it bailed out the savings and loan 
industry in the early 1990s.29 
In summary, the PBGC guaranty achieves the risk-minimization 
2
$ See ERISA§ 4006(a)(3)(A)(i), (E), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i), (E) (2006). 
26 Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Selected Interest Rates (Jan. 17, 2006), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl5/20060117 /h15.pdf. 
27 See ERISA§ 4006(a)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(7) (2006). 
28 See ERISA § 4022(g)(2), 29 U.S.C § 1322(g)(2) (2006) ("The United States 
government is not liable for any obligation or liability incurred by the [PBGC)."). 
29 Cf. Richard A. Ippolito, How to Reduce the Cost of Federal Pension 
Insurance, 523 CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2004), available at http://www.cato. 
org/pubs/pas/pa523.pdf. 
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goal by eliminating much (but not all) of the default risk that 
employees face. A system of user fees currently pays for this 
guaranty, but the system has a weak correlation to default risk and 
fails to keep the PBGC solvent. The next Part describes other 
protections for employees and shows how these protections tend to 
discourage the funding of pension plans.30 
C. Regulation of Pension Settlements 
The risk-minimization goal makes it expensive for companies to 
settle their pension obligations. The anti-alienation rule of ERISA 
prohibits employers from bargaining with employees over the 
settlement of pension obligations.31 Therefore, outside of bankruptcy 
or liquidation, the only ways for employers to discharge pension 
obligations are through regulated lump-sum payments, annuity 
purchases, and risk-free funding. Each of these methods has low risk, 
entailing interest rates lower than those at which employers can raise 
other sources of funds. This Part will show why those lower interest 
rates cause employers to resist funding their pension plans. 
An employer might try to discharge its pension obligations by 
paying a lump sum. Usually, an employee's pension benefit is stated 
as a single-life annuity that the employee may start taking at age sixty-
five. ERISA allows pension plans to pay benefits in a lump sum after 
an employee ends employment.32 These lump-sum options are 
increasingly common,33 but ERISA regulates their calculation. In 
order to arrive at a lump sum, the age sixty-five annuity must be 
converted to present value using mortality and interest assumptions. 
Before PP A 2006, ERISA obliged plans to calculate the lump sum 
using the interest rate on the 30-year Treasury bond.34 After PP A 
2006, lump-sum payments will be valued using the yield on high-grade 
corporate debt.35 
Regulating lump sums is necessary to implement the risk-
30 Cf William Sharpe, Corporate Pension Funding Policy, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 183 
(1976) (examining the effect of the PBGC gu~ranty on funding). 
31 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A). 
32 Pension payments before termination are generally prohibited. See Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.401-1(a)(2)(i) (1976). 
33 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY 
CORPORATION AND LONG-TERM BUDGETARY CHALLENGES 11 (2005) (describing 
increasing prevalence of lump-sum distributions from defined benefit plans). 
34 See Treas. Reg.§ 1.417(e)-1(d)(3)(i) (2003). 
35 See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 302(b), I.R.C. § 417(e). 
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minimization goal. Pension obligations are low risk and should be 
valued as such. However, the implementation causes employers to 
resist funding and other settlements of their pensions. It will usually 
cost employers more to borrow from outsiders than from their 
pensioners. 
To see this, suppose a company has a stylized pension that obliges 
the employer to make a $1 million balloon payment in ten years. The 
company can borrow money at 7%, but lump-sum distributions must 
be valued using a 5% interest rate. Essentially, the employer is 
borrowing from the employee at the regulated rate of 5% rather than 
the market rate of7%. 
The employer is considering two options for dealing with the 
pension plan. The first is simply to wait ten years and pay the $1 
million. The second is to discharge the pension today with a lump-
sum payment; the employer obtains the funds for the lump sum by 
borrowing, with repayment in ten years. Thus, comparing year ten 
cash flows will identify the better approach. 
The waiting approach obviously produces a year ten cash outflow 
of $1 million. The borrowing approach, however, produces a higher 
year ten outflow. ERISA mandates a lump-sum payment of 
$606,53136 which is $1 million discounted for ten years at 5%. 
However, the employer must repay this amount using a higher interest 
rate of 7%. The $606,531 debt grows to $1,221,40337 in ten years. 
Discharging the pension with outside borrowing is expensive because 
it subjects the employer to an interest-rate whipsaw. In essence, the 
employer would be refinancing its pension debt by giving up a low 5% 
interest rate in exchange for a high 7% interest rate. 
A similar whipsaw applies if the employer settles its obligation 
with an annuity contract or plan funding.38 Annuity contracts have 
low risk and will be valued using an interest rate that is likely lower 
than the employer's cost of borrowing. The yields published by the 
PBGC to value annuities are lower than the long-term risk-free rate.39 
36 $1,000,000 + (e111x1u15). 
37 $606,531 X ( e toxom). 
JS Readers familiar with academic finance may feel uneasy about these 
assertions. I am not saying that shareholder value falls when the company borrows at 
7% in order to buy a 5% risk-free bond. What reduces shareholder value is the 
transfer of the proceeds to the employee in satisfaction of the pension. 
39 The Internal Revenue Service (Service) reported rate of interest on 30-year 
Treasury securities for November 2005 is 4.73%. I.R.S. Notice 2005-96, 2005-2 C.B. 
1209. The PBGC interest rates for valuing annuity benefits for the month of 
November 2005 are 3.70% for the first 20 years following the date of plan termination 
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Similarly, plan funding must be in risk-free assets to achieve a true 
settlement. Otherwise, the employer remains subject to the risk of 
default on plan investments. Only if it fully funds the plan and has the 
plan invest in U.S. Treasury bonds will the employer be able to 
discharge its pension obligations completely. The discount rate for 
such a portfolio would be the long-term risk-free rate.40 
Thus, the cost of discharging pension obligations with full funding 
or annuity contracts is similar to that of discharging the obligations 
with lump-sum payments. In each case, liabilities must be measured 
according to some settlement rate of interest. This rate would differ 
based upon the settlement chosen (lump sum, risk-free funding, or 
annuity purchase).41 The important thing, however, is that the 
settlement rate will often be lower than the rate at which the 
employer could borrow funds. Because of this fact, plan funding and 
other settlements tend to be expensive. 
In summary, ERISA reinforces the risk-minimization goal by 
regulating the valuation of lump-sum distributions and by prohibiting 
sales by employees of their pension benefits. These regulations 
protect employees from selling their benefits too cheaply, but they 
also show how the risk-minimization goal affects employer incentives. 
The funding decision affects the value of the company because 
pension obligations, unlike other obligations of the company, are 
regulated to be low risk. In order to discharge pension obligations 
completely, employers can choose from three types of settlements: 
regulated lump sums, full funding with risk-free assets, or low-risk 
annuity contracts. However, employers cannot ordinarily borrow 
funds at the low interest rates associated with these settlements. Thus, 
without tax incentives, employers will resist funding their pension 
obligations. 
and 4.75% thereafter. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., INTEREST RATE UPDATE 
(Oct. 15, 2005), http://www.pbgc.gov/practitioners/interest-rates/content/Month2005 
/ir15126.html; cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SINGLE-EMPLOYER PENSION 
INSURANCE PROGRAM FACES SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM RISKS, 49-52 (2003) 
(comparing termination interest rates with 30-year Treasury interest rates). 
40 See Lawrence N. Bader, Pension Deficits: An Unnecessary Evil, FIN. 
ANALYSTS J., May-June 2004 at 17 [hereinafter Bader, Unnecessary Evil]; Bader & 
Gold, supra note 5, at 5. 
41 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, the accounting standard 
for pensions, adopts a similar concept of settlement rates. EMPLOYERS' AccouNTING 
FOR PENSIONS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, § 77 (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 1985). 
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D. Irrelevance of Moral Hazard 
Part II.C showed why employers would resist plan funding 
without the allure of tax benefits. This Part shows that employees 
have no reason to counteract this resistance. As a result, the main 
reasons that employers fund their plans are to receive tax benefits and 
to comply with the funding rules of ERISA. 
Employees covered by the guaranty have little reason to worry 
about plan funding. Without the PBGC guaranty, the employees 
would surely worry and might even demand more secure funding for 
their pension benefits. Because of the PBGC guaranty, extra funding 
gives the employees little extra security. Thus, the employer's funding 
decision and the employees' desires are hardly related at all.42 
The employees' indifference to funding presents a technical case 
of moral hazard. Ultimately, we will see that the case is merely 
technical and tells us very little of importance about pension funding 
and insurance. Since, however, moral hazard is such a common 
critique of the current system,43 it is addressed here. What is moral 
hazard? In Game Theory and the Law, the authors note: 
Insurance contracts must also take into account a moral 
hazard problem, a problem of hidden action. An insurer is 
not able to learn exactly how an individual behaves once the 
insurance contract is purchased. Hence, the contract cannot 
be written in a way that protects the insurance company from 
42 Professor Keating makes a similar point. He says: 
While the ability of employers to affect pension funding is fairly clear, the 
role of the employees in avoiding the risk of underfunding should not be 
overlooked. In the LTV Supreme Court case, the PBGC stressed how 
employees can influence the funding levels of their promised pensions. 
One of the reasons the PBGC does not completely cover all pension 
benefits is that employees will have some incentive to insist to their 
employers that pension plans be adequately funded - the so-called "co-
insurance feature" of the system. 
Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 
65, 75 [hereinafter Keating, Moral Hazard]. Indeed, some empirical evidence 
supports the notion that the PBGC guaranty actually reduced funding quality. See 
RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 95, 125-295 (1989). 
43 See, e.g., Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 42, passim; Nicholas J. Brannick, 
Note, At the Crossroads of Three Codes: How Employers Are Using ERISA, the Tax 
Code, and Bankruptcy to Evade Their Pension Obligations, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1577 
passim (2004). 
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individuals taking actions they would not take if they did not 
h . 44 ave msurance. 
Other standard works state that hidden action is the meaning of moral 
hazard.45 The essence of this hidden action is that it is conduct that 
contractual parties or regulators cannot control cost effectively. 
However, moral hazard implies a level of futility that is absent 
from the ERISA context. A typical case of moral hazard involves the 
standard of care that an insured exercises over insured property. 
Buyers of home insurance will lower the precautions they take against 
fire and theft. Insurers and buyers would be better off if they could 
execute enforceable contracts that say, "The insured shall exercise the 
same standard of care over the property that he would exercise if the 
policy were not in place." Enforcing such a clause is absurd, because 
the insurer must be able to determine the actual standard of care 
exercised and the standard of care that would have been exercised had 
the contract never existed. Because insurers cannot enforce this 
clause, the standard of care exercised by insurance buyers will fall. 
The literal definition of moral hazard does apply to employees. 
Because of the PBGC guaranty, they have no reason to demand 
greater funding or conservative investment of funds. However, there 
is no need to worry about whether the employees bargain for the right 
44 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 153 (1998). 
45 See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 577 (1990) 
(referring to moral hazard as the problem where "one party to a transaction may 
undertake certain actions that (a) affect the other party's valuation of the transaction 
but that (b) the second party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly"); ANDREU MAS-
COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 477 (1995) (referring to moral hazard as 
the case of hidden action); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 298--99 (3d 
ed. 1992) (stating that the problem of moral hazard in insurance contracts would 
disappear if insurers could observe the level of care taken by their insureds). Some 
scholars define the term differently. Judge Posner calls moral hazard "The tendency 
of an insured to relax his efforts to prevent the occurrence of the risk that he has 
insured against because he has shifted the risk to an insurance company." RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (6th ed. 2003). This formulation is 
close to hidden action, although it would cover precautions that might be controlled 
by contract, such as a home-insurance discount for the use of sprinklers. Professor 
Richard Ippolito gives a broad definition that moral hazard occurs "when mispricing 
arises in a buyer-seller contract." RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LA WYERS 
350 (2005). Professor Keating calls it "[t]he problem ... that those who are insured 
against certain risks have an incentive to use less than optimal care to avoid those 
risks." Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 42, at 67-68. For a detailed examination 
of moral hazard, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 
237 (1996). 
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level of funding. All that matters ultimately is the level of plan 
funding, which is not hidden and can be regulated. ERISA should 
simply require funding that minimizes the risk of default. Part III lays 
out the case for full funding. Part IV sketches a proposal that would 
implement full funding. 
III. EMPLOYER-INTERNALIZATION GOAL 
A. Introduction 
The previous Part identified the risk-minimization goal as central 
to ERISA. This goal holds that employees should face little if any 
default risks on their pensions. This Part will discuss the employer-
internalization goal, which holds that employers should bear the cost 
of accomplishing the risk-minimization goal, but only with respect to 
their own employees. Part III.B will show how pension obligations 
are like debt obligations, because employers can avoid paying these 
costs only through liquidation or bankruptcy. 
Unless plans are fully funded, the avoidance of pension 
obligations in liquidation or bankruptcy violates the employer-
internalization goal. Part III.C will show how ERISA falls short of 
requiring funding that would satisfy the employer-internalization goal. 
Yet, employers are free to contribute more than what is required by 
the funding rules. The main reason to do so would be tax benefits. 
Part III.D examines the interaction of the funding rules and the rules 
for tax deductibility. The conclusion is that employers with high costs 
of borrowing and low marginal tax rates will resist funding their plans. 
Part III.E uses this conclusion to build a normative case for the 
employer-internalization goal. Current law subsidizes underfunding 
by companies with high borrowing costs and low tax rates. Thus, 
current law can be seen as a form of lemon socialism, where weak 
companies are subsidized at the expense of the strong. 
B. Obligation to Pay 
A pensiOn plan is an obligation to pay cash in the future. 46 
46 Cf John Ralfe et al., Pensions and Capital Structure: Why Hold Equities in the 
Pension Fund?, N. AM. AcrUARIALl., July 2004, at 103. Ralfe states: 
Pension promises represent a debt owed by the company to the pension 
plan members. Pension liabilities are economic liabilities of the company, 
not the pension plan, as the company has to make good shortfalls in the 
pension plan. The pension represents a debt owed by the company to the 
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Because pension plans typically cover large groups of employees, the 
law of large numbers allows employers and their actuaries to project a 
reasonably accurate schedule of cash payments to be made in the 
future. These cash payments are like debt repayments. ERISA 
makes the pension promise enforceable in federal court and prevents 
an employer from conditioning payments on having enough profits or 
the like. Before ERISA, employers could terminate underfunded 
plans without incurring any obligation to fund the shortfalls. Because 
there was no federal pension guaranty at that time, participants 
potentially bore the full loss without any further claim against the 
47 
employer. 
Even in its early days, ERISA allowed at-will termination of 
underfunded plans, but protected the employees with the PBGC 
guaranty of benefits. The PBGC had some recourse when an 
employer terminated an underfunded plan. The plan termination 
gave the PBGC all plan assets plus a claim against the employer for 
the shortfall. But, the claim was limited to 30% of the net worth of 
the employer and its controlled group.48 This structure led financial 
economists to conclude that the employer essentially held a put 
option. The economists thought that ERISA allowed a company to 
force (put) its pension liabilities upon the PBGC in exchange for 
giving up the plan assets and 30% of the company's net worth.49 The 
put right was unilateral, as it was not conditioned upon bankruptcy or 
other financial distress. Because of this ability to avoid pension 
liabilities, some economists questioned whether pension plans could 
be thought of as debt. 50 
The unilateral put right was ended in 1986, with the passage of the 
Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (SEPPA).51 SEPPA 
pension fund members. 
/d. at 104. Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 42, at 77 ("When a company 
underfunds its pension plan, the firm is in effect 'borrowing' money from the PBGC 
on an unsecured basis similar to a firm's drawing down an unsecured line of credit."). 
47 See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 910. 
48 See McGILL ET AL., supra note 23, at 806--D7. 
49 Cf, e.g., Sharpe, supra note 30, at 185 (creating a model where " [i]f there is a 
shortfall, the employees will receive only [the plan assets], and the company will not 
be liable for the deficiency"). 
~ See id. 
51 Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 
100 Stat. 82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Recent 
commentators remain under the misimpression that total liability is 30%. See, e.g., 
MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 
270 (3d ed. 2005) ("After the passage of ERISA, firms can now put the pension plan 
534 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 26:519 
established three types of plan terminations. If a plan is fully funded, 
the employer can terminate it at will after complying with PBGC 
procedures in a "standard termination."52 The plan terminates by 
offering annuity contracts (issued by insurance companies) and lump-
sum distributions to the participants. The standard termination fully 
discharges the claims of the employees and removes the PBGC from 
any potential liability for the plan. 53 
SEPP A established two procedures by which underfunded plans 
could terminate. They are a "distress termination"54 and an 
"involuntary termination."55 Both types of terminations are 
conditioned upon financial distress by the employer.56 Termination by 
either method is usually used during liquidation or Chapter 11 
reorganization.57 The distinction between the two is that the employer 
institutes a distress termination, whereas the PBGC institutes an 
involuntary termination. 58 Without terminating the underfunded plan, 
the employer will need to contribute funds to the plan according to 
the funding requirements of the Internal Review Code (Code) and 
assets plus 30% of the market value of the company to the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) to satisfy the pension claims."). 
52 See ERISA § 4041(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2006) (setting forth exclusive 
means for plan terminations); ERISA § 4041(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b) (2006) 
(describing standard terminations). 
53 For example, the PBGC takes the position that it has no obligation to insure 
benefits if an insurance company fails to pay on the annuity contracts. See PBGC 
Letter on PBGC Liability for Payment of Benefits in Case of Annuity Contract 
Failure, reprinted in 18 BNA PENSION REP. 850 (1991). Moreover, the PBGC takes 
the position that the employer itself has no such liability. See PBGC Letter on Plan 
Sponsor Liability after Purchase of Group Annuity Contract, reprinted in 18 BNA 
PENSION REP. 850 (1991). 
54 See ERISA§ 4041(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c) (2006). 
55 See ERISA§ 4042,29 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). 
~6 See ERISA§ 4041(c)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B) (2006); ERISA § 
4041(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006). 
57 See Frank Cummings, Pension Plan Terminations - Single Employer Plans, 
TAXMGMf. PORTFOLIO (BNA) No. 357-3d, at A-18 (2002). 
58 !d. at A-17 to -18. In Chapter 11 reorganization, a collective-bargaining 
agreement can prevent termination of the plan. See ERISA § 4043(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a)(3) (2006). Collective bargaining agreements do not prevent the PBGC 
from seeking an involuntary termination of the plan. See id. Chapter-11 employers 
often ask the PBGC to seek an involuntary termination in order to overcome 
collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 640 (1990) ("LTV, however, could not voluntarily terminate the 
Plans because two of them had been negotiated in collective bargaining. LTV 
therefore sought to have the PBGC terminate the Plans."). 
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ERISA.59 Thus, distress termination and involuntary termination are 
the only ways to avoid the pension liabilities of underfunded pension 
plans. 
The PBGC does receive debt claims following distress or 
involuntary terminations for the funding shortfall of the plan.60 The 
claim is for the value of all benefits (not just those benefits that the 
PBGC guaranties) under the plan, minus the value of plan assets.61 
Thus, the claim of the PBGC goes beyond its own financial exposure 
to guarantied benefits.62 It acts as more than a mere guarantor with a 
right of subrogation against the debtor. It is also a collection agency 
for employees, with the authority to seek funds from the employer to 
pay benefit obligations in excess of those it has guarantied.63 For 
example, suppose that a plan terminates with $10 million in assets, $10 
million in PBGC-guarantied benefits, and $5 million in other benefits. 
The PBGC receives a claim for the $5 million shortfall, enforceable on 
behalf of employees, even though the PBGC has no liability of its 
own. If the liability exceeds 30% of the combined net worth of the 
employer and its affiliates, then the liability exceeding such 30% may 
be deferred on commercially reasonable terms.64 
Upon a distress or involuntary termination, the PBGC receives a 
lien in the property of the employer and its affiliates, capped at 30% 
of the combined net worth of their total property.65 If termination 
occurs after bankruptcy, the automatic stay will prevent the PBGC 
from perfecting its lien.66 The resulting inability of the PBGC to 
perfect its lien usually leaves it as an unsecured creditor in 
bankruptcy. As a result of its unsecured status, the PBGC will likely 
recover only a portion of its claim. If the termination occurs in 
Chapter 11, the PBGC may even receive stock in the bankrupt 
59 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of these requirements. 
60 See Daniel Keating, Chapter ll's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and 
Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813-15 (1993) [hereinafter Keating, Ten-Ton 
Monster] (describing the PBGC claims after plan termination). 
61 See ERISA§ 4001(a)(18), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(18) (2006). 
62 Cf. ERISA § 4001(a)(17), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(17) (2006) (defining "amount 
of unfunded guarantied benefit liabilities" to cover only those benefits guarantied by 
the PBGC). 
63 See ERISA § 4022(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (2006) (stating that the PBGC will 
pay additional benefits attributable to its recovery efforts). 
64 See ERISA§ 4062(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(2) (2006). 
65 See ERISA§ 4068(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2006). 
66 See Keating, Ten-Ton Monster, supra note 60, at 827. 
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employer to satisfy its claim.67 The potential to perfect a lien is 
important, even if the PBGC rarely does so. Outside of bankruptcy or 
liquidation, few plan sponsors attempt distress terminations because 
the PBGC could perfect its lien. 
A distress or involuntary termination is more limited than a 
bankruptcy discharge. A significant difference is the power of the 
PBGC to restore the terminated plan to the employer if the employer 
later has a significant improvement in financial health.68 Another 
difference is the surcharge that the PBGC imposes on plans that 
terminate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy - $1250 per participant per year 
for three years following termination.69 Thus, employers must actually 
pay a substantial fee to discharge their pension obligations in Chapter 
11. These two differences (restoration and surcharge) are minor and 
illustrate that discharging pension obligations is actually more difficult 
than discharging other debt. 
In summary, employers have a legal obligation to pay pension 
obligations that is similar to the obligation to pay debt. Employers 
can terminate fully funded plans at will, but must be in financial 
distress (typically bankruptcy or liquidation) to terminate 
underfunded plans. Termination gives the PBGC claims against the 
employer (and affiliates) for any funding shortfall. Thus, employers 
can avoid their pension obligations, but can do so only in the way they 
avoid other obligations - through bankruptcy or liquidation. 
Recall, however, that the risk-minimization goal minimizes the 
risk of employer default faced by employees. The employer-
internalization goal is thwarted if employers escape pension 
obligations after bankruptcy or liquidation. Someone other than the 
employer bears the burden of these obligations. Full funding of 
pension plans would be needed to achieve the employer-
internalization goal and the failure of current law to achieve this goal 
is introduced in the next Part. 
C. Obligation to Fund 
1. Introduction 
Part II demonstrated that ERISA largely achieves the risk-
minimization goal. Its ultimate failure to achieve the employer-
67 See Michael Schroeder, Big Stakes in Ailing Airlines Raise Questions for U.S. 
Pension Agency, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2005, at Al. 
68 See ERISA§ 4047,29 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006). 
69 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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internalization goal is established in this Part. 
Part II.B showed how the premium charged by the PBGC barely 
relates to risk of default. Thus, the premium system fails to achieve 
the employer-internalization goal. Part III.B showed that employers 
do have a legal obligation to pay pension obligations, but this 
obligation can be avoided by plan termination in bankruptcy or 
liquidation. Employers need to internalize the cost of paying pension 
obligations for all contingencies, whether or not they end up in 
bankruptcy or liquidation. Thus, the law of plan terminations falls 
short of the employer-internalization goal. 
Posting enough collateral by funding the pension obligation 
would satisfy the employer-internalization goal and ERISA does 
require some plan funding. As this Part will show, however, ERISA 
falls well short of the full funding that would be need to satisfy the 
employer-internalization goal. 
2. Discounting Pension Liabilities to Present Value 
The starting point for the funding rules is a determination of the 
plan's liabilities. Pension plans represent an employer's obligation to 
pay cash in the future and these obligations are valued by discounting 
to present value. The crucial assumption in this valuation is the 
interest rate used, as higher interest rates lead to lower present values. 
A leading treatise notes: 
The present value of a series of future contingent payments is 
a function of the rate of investment return, or of interest at 
which the payments are discounted - the higher the interest 
assumption, the smaller the present value. Pension plan costs 
and liabilities are extremely sensitive to the interest 
assumption in the valuation formula because of the long time-
lapse between the accrual of a benefit credit and its payment. 
The precise impact of the interest assumption depends upon 
[other actuarial assumptions]; but it is a fairly sound 
generalization that, for a typical plan, a change (upward or 
downward) of 1[%] in the interest assumption (e.g., an 
increase from 6 to 7[%]) alters the long-run cost estimate by 
about 25[% ].70 
70 
MCGILL ET AL., supra note 23, at 611-12. Other sources suggest that the 25% 
figure is too high. See, e.g., Daniel Farley, Selecting a "Liability Appropriate" Fixed 
Income Mgt Approach, POINT OF VIEW, Dec. 15, 2003, http://www. ssga.cornllibrary/ 
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In recent times, the funding rules have specified two rates for valuing 
pension liabilities: high-grade corporate bonds and 30-year Treasury 
bonds. Current law uses high-grade corporate bonds.71 
To see the practical difference between the two rates, consider 
that a 1% increase in the discount rate might lower the reported value 
of pension liabilities by 10% to 25%.72 The high-grade corporate 
73 bond rate for December 2003 was 5.81 %, whereas the 30-year 
Treasury rate for December 2003 was 5.07% - a difference of 
0.74%.74 Compared to the Treasury rate, the corporate rate might 
lower the reported value of plan liabilities by 7.4% to 18.5%. Higher 
interest rates produce lower liabilities, at least on paper. These lower 
liabilities reduce the obligation to fund a plan. 
Full implementation of the risk-minimization goal implies that the 
30-year Treasury rate is correct. If pension obligations are to be truly 
risk free, then they must be discounted at a risk-free rate. It is a false 
argument that plans are able to earn rates of return higher than the 
risk-free rate by investing in equities or corporate bonds. This 
argument confuses earned returns and expected returns. A plan can 
expect a higher rate of return by investing in risky assets, but it must 
subject itself to risk in order to earn it. The higher return is not 
earned until after the risk turns out well. If the risk turns out badly, 
asset values fall, creating a funding shortfall. Thus, a mismatch 
between the fixed liability and the risky asset endangers plan 
funding. 75 Indeed, the mismatch between plan assets and liabilities is a 
major cause of the current problems of the PBGC.76 
The value of a liability is the cost of discharging it, whether or not 
the debtor sets aside high-yield or low-yield assets to fund it. 
Consumers do not get to discount their debt payments by paying them 
povw/danfarleyselectingaliabilty20031215/page.html (asserting that a typical plan has 
a liability duration of ten to fifteen years). 
71 See I.R.C. § 412(b)(5). PPA 2006 will change the calculation of this rate 
starting in 2008. Then, the funding rules will incorporate a yield curve (e.g., with 
short-term rates applying to short-term obligations). See Pension Protection Act of 
2006 § 112, I.R.C. § 430. 
72 d See supra note 70 an accompanying text. 
73 I.R.S. Notice 2004-34, 2004-1 C.B. 848. 
74 I.R.S. Notice 2004-3, 2004-1 C.B. 391. 
75 See G. Bennett Stewart III, Pension Roulette: Have You Bet Too Much on 
Equities?, HARV. Bus. REV., June 2003, at 104, 105. 
76 See Zvi Bodie, On Asset-Liability Matching and Federal Deposit and Pension 
Insurance, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., July-Aug. 2006, at 323 [hereinafter 
Bodie, Asset-Liability Matching]. 
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off in stock rather than cash and plan sponsors should not either.77 
There are, however, legitimate arguments for using something 
higher than the risk·free rate. Unlike Treasury bonds, the PBGC 
guaranty carries some risk of default and the guaranty is capped. 
Also, employers can use the high·grade corporate bond rate to settle 
their pension obligations. Starting in 2008, employers will calculate 
lump·sum distributions using high·grade corporate bond yields. And, 
it is possible that employers can satisfy their pension obligations by 
purchasing annuity contracts that are valued using something higher 
than the risk·free rate.78 
This Article will leave the correct discount rate as an issue 
needing more research. Part IV.B does suggest a bifurcated approach 
that would value PBGC guarantied benefits at the risk-free rate and 
other benefits at some higher rate. What should be clear, however, is 
that liabilities should be valued using current, not historical, interest 
rates. The problem of smoothing over asset and liability values with 
historical averages is discussed in the next Part. 
3. Smoothing Assets and Liabilities Using Historical Averages 
Rather than value assets at current fair market value and 
liabilities at current interest rates, the funding rules allow plans to use 
average asset values and average interest rates, determined over an 
historical period. These smoothing rules continue a theme first 
discussed in the prior subpart - protecting employers from financial 
market volatility. As in the prior subpart, however, volatility creates 
real shortfalls, which the PBGC guaranties. Left unfunded, these 
shortfalls violate the employer·intemalization goal. Yet, the funding 
rules are drafted specifically to wish· away shortfalls created by 
volatility. 
In valuing assets, Treasury regulations currently allow smoothing 
of asset values over five years.79 PP A 2006 also allows for smoothing 
with historical averages, but only over two years. The asset smoothing 
rules do limit deviations from current values; the resulting average 
n Cf Lawrence N. Bader, The Case Against Stock in Corporate Pension Funds, 
PENSION SEC. NEWS, Feb. 2003, at 17 ("[C]ompanies add no value for shareholders by 
doing what the shareholders could do for themselves - investing in publicly traded 
securities."). 
78 But cf Bader, Unnecessary Evil, supra note 40, at 19 ("[A]nnuity purchase 
rates are unlikely to be significantly (if at all) below liabilities that combine Treasury 
rates with the demographic assumptions used for funding the plans."). 
79 I.R.C. § 412(c)(2)(A). 
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must be between 90% and 110% of the fair market value of plan 
assets.80 In valuing liabilities, current law allows plans to average the 
discount rate over four years.81 PPA 2006 shortens the averaging 
period to two years.82 Unlike the smoothing rules for asset valuations, 
the interest smoothing rules do not limit deviations from current 
interest rates. 
These smoothing mechanisms mask the shortfalls created by 
financial volatility. Suppose that, last year, a plan was fully funded 
(but just barely). If interest rates fall one percentage point (e.g., from 
7% to 6% ), liability values would almost certainly rise by at least 
10%? Adding a 10% decline in the plan's asset values could create a 
funding shortfall of 20%, based on market values. Because of 
smoothing conventions, the funding rules recognize only a fraction of 
the true shortfall that has been created. 
But employees and the PBGC are exposed to underfunding based 
on market values, not accounting conventions and wishful thinking. 
Smoothing violates the weak form of the random walk theory of asset 
prices (also known as the efficient market theory). If an asset is worth 
$100 today, its value from last year has no effect on its expected value 
a year from now. Moreover, the smoothing rules implicitly allow an 
employer to satisfy liabilities with assets valued at historical prices. 
The prior subpart showed how incredible it would be to apply the 
funding rules to consumer debt, noting that consumers cannot 
discount debt payments by paying with high-yield stock rather than 
zero-yield cash.84 For the same reason, consumers cannot ask their 
lenders to accept payment in stock based on values from last year. 
But smoothing is not the most significant failure of the funding 
rules. Even after obscuring the values of assets and liabilities, the 
funding rules allow employers to defer the obligation to satisfy the 
resulting short fall. This deferral mechanism is discussed in the next 
subpart. 
4. Deferring Shortfalls Using Amortizations and Waivers 
Achieving the employer-internalization goal would require full 
funding of pension plans at all times. The previous subpart showed 
how accounting conventions obscure the measurement of funding 
80 See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(g)(3). 
81 See I.R.C. § 412(b)(5). 
82 See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(h)(2). 
83 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
84 See supra text accompanying note 77. 
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shortfalls. This subpart shows that the funding rules fail to require full 
funding of the incorrectly measured shortfall. 
Current law and PP A 2006 both require annual contributions to 
underfunded plans equal to the normal cost, which is the portion of 
liabilities attributable to the current year.85 But plans can have very 
large shortfalls independent of the normal cost. For example, an 
employer might voluntarily increase liabilities by increasing plan 
benefits. Or financial volatility might produce funding shortfalls when 
asset values fall and liability values rise (in response to falling interest 
rates). Current law allows plans to amortize these liabilities over 
periods ranging from five to thirty years.86 PPA 2006 provides a single 
period of seven years to amortize most other liabilities.87 More lenient 
rules apply to the airlines.88 Thus, neither PP A 2006 nor current law 
tries to force employers to fund their plans fully. 
Plans with very poor funding may face additional contributions. 
However, these contributions still fall short of full funding. In 
simplified terms, current law requires an additional contribution if the 
plan is less than 80% funded (and possibly if the plan is less than 
90% ). The additional contribution is between 18% and 30% of the 
plan's underfunding; the applicable percentage depends on the 
severity of underfunding. PP A 2006 calculates additional 
contributions differently, requiring them if plan funding is below two 
thresholds. The first threshold is a current-year funding level of 80% 
using ordinary actuarial assumptions. The second threshold is a 
previous-year funding level of 70% using more stringent actuarial 
assumptions. These percentages are phased in from 2008 to 2011. A 
plan that meets neither threshold will have its required contribution 
increased according to the more stringent assumptions and will pay an 
additional charge of $700 per participant and 4% of plan liabilities. 
More lenient rules apply to the automobile industry.89 
The precise details of this system are not, however, very 
important. What is important is that both current law and PP A 2006 
tolerate funding shortfalls over extended periods of time. Employers 
are responsible for immediate funding of only a fraction of the 
s.~ See I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(A); Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. 
§ 430(a)(l)(A). No contribution is required, however, if the plan is fully funded. See 
I.R.C. § 412(c)(6); Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(a)(2). 
86 See I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(B). 
g) See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(c)(2). 
88 See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 402(a), 120 Stat. 
780,922. 
89 See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(i)(4)(C). 
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funding shortfalls in their plans. 
Employers can avoid making even this contribution by obtaining 
a funding waiver from the Internal Revenue Service (Service), which 
may waive the required contributions if the employer is "unable to 
satisfy the minimum funding standard . . . without temporary 
substantial business hardship ... and if application of the [funding] 
standard would be adverse to the interests of plan participants in the 
aggregate .... "90 A key reason for granting the waiver is the fear that 
the plan would be terminated unless a waiver is granted.91 Waived 
liabilities must be amortized over five years.92 
Funding waivers are particularly incoherent compared to the 
additional contributions required from poorly funded plans. On the 
one hand, the funding rules excuse the shakiest companies from 
making contributions if they successfully plead their case to the 
Service. On the other hand, the funding rules require enhanced 
contributions from companies with the most poorly funded plans. 
Even the institutional goals of the agencies are crossed. The Service 
administers the funding rules and sees tax revenues increase when 
employers make lower plan contributions. The PBGC administers the 
insurance system and sees its risk exposure increase when employers 
make lower plan contributions. Funding waivers are thus a fitting end 
to the brief review of the funding rules contained in this Part. 
5. Summary 
In summary, neither current law nor PP A 2006 achieves the 
employer-internalization goal. Both sets of law distort the 
measurement of assets and liabilities by allowing employers to use 
historical values and smoothing rather . than market values. More 
importantly, both sets of law fail to require full funding of the 
shortfalls that are recognized under the flawed standards. Instead, 
employers can amortize the shortfalls over five or more years. Finally, 
and perhaps most perversely, both sets of law allow employers to 
avoid paying the insufficient funding obligations by seeking a waiver 
from the Service - an institution that has no discernable interest in 
the sufficiency of plan funding. 
As a result, current law and PP A 2006 subsidize the underfunding 
of pension plans. But, how much should the American public care? 
90 l.R.C. § 412(d)(l). 
91 See I.R.C. § 412(d)(2)(D). 
92 See I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(C). 
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Pension subsidies, paid for by taxpayers, are nothing new. Taxpayers 
are already subsidizing pension plans through the Code at an annual 
expense that is far greater than the overall deficit of the PBGC.93 The 
remainder of this Part will discuss why the PBGC subsidy is 
particularly objectionable, thus supplying normative support for the 
employer-internalization goal. To this end, the next Part will develop 
a theory of funding to show why financially strong employers tend to 
fund their plans while financially weak ones resist funding. 
D. Taxes, the Cost of Capital, and the Funding Decision 
Without the regulation and tax structure of pension law, 
employers might be indifferent to funding their pension plans. 
Companies might borrow from outsiders and replace pension debt 
with outside debt.94 Shareholders may not care whether their 
company owes money to an employee or a bank. Part II.C, however, 
showed why employers care. Pension regulation makes funding a plan 
expensive. Because pension obligations are regulated, they must be 
discounted at low interest rates. If these low rates are lower than the 
rates at which employers could borrow, employers will resist plan 
funding. In addition, the funding rules require only a fraction of full 
funding. However, as discussed in this Part, the taxation of pensions 
could prompt an employer to fund above the minimum amount.95 
Without the cash on hand to fund the plan, employers could 
borrow from third parties. Borrowing to fund the pension plan 
merely replaces one creditor (the employees) with another (the third-
93 The tax subsidy for these plans is about $108 billion per year. See STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005-2009, at 38 (Joint Comm. Print 2005). 
Perhaps half of that can be attributed to defined-benefit pension plans. In 
comparison, recall that the expected deficit for all claims the PBGC expects to pay is 
$23.1 billion. 
94 See Bader, Unnecessary Evil, supra note 40, at 15. 
95 See Regina T. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Funding: How Much is Too Much?, 
44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 52 (1993) ("[A]n employer subject to federal income tax is 
usually reluctant to contribute more than can be deducted in a plan year . ... "); cf 
Fischer Black, The Tax Consequences of Long-Run Pension Policy, J. APPLIED CoRP. 
FIN., Winter 2006, at 8 (examining the tax incentives to fund a pension plan); Irwin 
Tepper, Tax and Corporate Pension Policy, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1976). One might be 
able to create an elaborate story in which employers fund their plans as a way to 
signal its true cost to outside investors. This seems unlikely as the essence of funding 
is to harm outside investors by exempting assets from their claims. Moreover, funding 
levels are determined by actuarial methods, the results of which can be simply 
communicated to outside investors. 
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party lenders). The interest cost of new debt is a proxy for the cost of 
other sources of capital. Rather than borrowing to fund the plan, the 
company could also issue new equity or use working capital. Those 
decisions are about the company's capital structure. Under the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem the decision does not affect company value 
unless the decision affects taxes and transactions costs.96 
So, this Part will assume that the source of funding comes from 
outside borrowing, but the analysis would hold if funding came from 
another source. This Part will compare the cost of leaving a plan 
unfunded with the cost of paying lump sums. Lump-sum payments 
are computationally convenient and reflect the cost of discharging 
pension obligations. Paying the lump sum is simply one type of 
settlement. Other types of settlement (full funding and annuity 
purchases) would be analyzed exactly the same way after identifying 
the appropriate settlement rate. 
Recall the stylized pension plan and example in Part II.C. There, 
the employer had a pension plan that will pay $1 million in ten years. 
The employer can borrow at 7%, but the statutory rate for valuing 
lump sums is 5%. The employer looks at two approaches: wait-and-
pay (under which the employer does no funding and pays the pension 
in ten years) and borrow-to-pay (under which the employer borrows 
the funds needed to pay a lump sum). The example in Part II.C 
showed that the employer would resist settling the pension today and 
would choose wait-and-pay approach.97 
Let us introduce the effect of taxation and suppose the employer 
is subject to a 50% income tax rate. Now, the employer will pursue 
the borrow-to-pay approach. The employer will see that the wait-and-
pay approach results in a year ten cash outflow of $500,000. Code 
section 404 denies the employer any deduction for the pension 
expense until funding actually occurs.98 Because the $1 million 
payment would be deductible - but only in year ten - it costs the 
employer only $500,000. The borrow-to-pay approach results in the 
employer paying a lump sum of $606,531, which is $1 million 
discounted by the settlement rate of 5%. A contribution of $606,531 
is deductible and has an after-tax cost of only $303,265. The employer 
borrows this amount and pays an after-tax rate of interest at only 
3.5%; the true cost of borrowing is reduced to reflect the value of the 
tax deduction. If the employer structures the debt as a balloon 
96 See POSNER, supra note 45, at 476. 
97 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
98 See I.R.C. § 404. 
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repayment in ten years,99 it will need to repay $430,354100 in ten years. 
Comparing the year ten cash outflows, the wait-and-pay approach 
costs $500,000 and the borrow-to-fund approach costs $430,354. So, 
the employer will choose to fund the plan and pay the lump sum. 
The after-tax cost of borrowing accounts for the difference in the 
two examples. In the zero-tax example, it truly cost the employer 7% 
to borrow funds. In the 50%-tax example, it cost the employer only 
3.5% to borrow funds. Thus, the relevant question is whether the 
after-tax cost of borrowing is above or below the settlement rate. If it 
is above, the employer does not fund. If it is below, the employer 
does fund. 
Although the settlement rate is the same for all employers, the 
marginal tax rate and borrowing rate vary widely.101 Financially strong 
employers tend to have low borrowing rates and high tax rates. As a 
result, they will tend to fund their plans. Financially weak employers 
tend to have high borrowing rates and low tax rates. As a result, 
financially weak companies will tend to resist funding their plans.102 
99 Repayment of the interest in ten years does not prevent an accrual-method 
taxpayer from deducting interim interest. Most corporate employers are accrual basis 
taxpayers. See I.R.C. §§ 446, 448. Accrual basis taxpayers may deduct items before 
cash payment, if the item is represented by a liability, once "all the events have 
occurred that establish the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can be 
determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has occurred with 
respect to the liability." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii)(A) (2006); see also I.R.C. § 
461(h)(2)(A)(i) (stating that economic performance by employer occurs when 
employee performs services). This "all-events test" is the key to accrual accounting 
and would allow the employer to deduct compensation paid with borrowed funds plus 
any interest expenses. 
100 $303,265 X ( eJOxn.nJs). 
101 The before-tax borrowing rate could be determined by looking at publicly 
traded debt. The tax rate (which determines the after-tax borrowing rate) is more 
complicated. Perhaps the best concept here is of a marginal tax rate: the present 
value of any additional taxes incurred by reason of an additional dollar of income. 
For many corporations, an additional dollar of current income can affect the tax 
liabilities for prior and later tax years (e.g., because of the carry back and carry 
forward of net operating losses). Financial economists have used sophisticated 
techniques to estimate marginal tax rates for corporations. See generally SCHOLES ET 
AL., supra note 51, at 184-93. 
102 Cf Andrew H. Chen & James L. Bicksler, The Integration of Insurance and 
Taxes in Corporate Pension Strategy, 40 J. FIN. 943 (1985) (identifying the "tax effect" 
and the "insurance effect" as the two main determinants of a corporation's funding 
strategy). Empirical research has linked poor financial health and low pension 
funding. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RECENT EXPERIENCES OF LARGE 
DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS ILLUSTRATE WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES 4 (2005); 
Watson Wyatt, Cashing In: Do Aggressive Funding Policies Lead to Higher Credit 
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The normative implications of this failure are discussed in the next 
Part. 
E. Lemon Socialism and Subsidized Underfunding 
By insuring pension obligations against employer default, the 
PBGC guaranty satisfies the risk-minimization goal. However, by 
collecting inadequate premiums and demanding minimal 
contributions, the funding and insurance rules fail to satisfy the 
employer-internalization goal. Thus, current law and PP A 2006 
subsidize underfunded pension plans. This Part will describe how the 
PBGC subsidy harms the beneficial discipline of capital markets. 
Premium payments by well-funded plans have kept the PBGC 
from collapse. Some have even suggested that transfers were an 
intentional part of "industrial policy" at the time ERISA was 
passed.103 Such transfers run the risk of creating an adverse-selection 
problem, driving the best risks out of the insurance pool and leaving 
only the worst.104 Although transfers among employers might be 
political reality, they are not good policy. 
Ultimately, the PBGC subsidy might cost taxpayers, who could be 
called upon for a savings-and-loan-style bailout. Taxpayers already 
subsidize pension plans through the Code at an annual expense that is 
far greater than the overall deficit of the PBGC.105 Unlike the tax 
subsidy, however, a PBGC subsidy interferes with workings of capital 
markets. Rather than exploring the fiscal cost of a PBGC bailout 
(which could be large),106 this Part will instead focus on how the 
PBGC guaranty interferes with capital markets. 
Capital markets channel scarce resources to projects with the 
highest returns. Projects with low or negative expected returns do not 
receive funding. By distorting this channeling mechanism, the 
subsidized PBGC guaranty allows employers to pursue risky and low-
return projects. To see how, suppose that, instead of guarantying 
pensions, the government agreed to guaranty any commercial debt. 
The only qualification is that the borrower must agree to give up any 
Ratings?, INSIDER, Oct. 2005, http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/show 
article.asp? Art-iclelD=15305. 
103 See Zvi Bodie, What the Pension Benefit G~:taranty Corporation Can Learn 
from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 10 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 
83 (1996). 
104 See id. at 84. 
105 See supra note 93. 
·~ 3 See Bodie, Asset-Liability Matching, supra note 76, at 24-28. 
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tax deduction for the interest expense. The hypothetical guaranty 
would be enormously expensive for taxpayers. But, let us ignore 
taxpayer expense, as we are with the PBGC guaranty. Is there any 
other reason for society to reject the hypothetical loan guaranty? The 
answer turns out to be "yes," because the guaranty diverts scarce 
capital to wasteful and risky projects. 
The proper channeling of capital, without the interference of 
federal loan guaranties, can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that 
ABC Co. is being formed. Currently, the risk-free rate of interest is 
5% and ABC Co. is looking to borrow funds. Fortunately for ABC 
Co., lenders are risk neutral in this hypothetical world. Risk 
neutrality does not, however, mean that ABC Co. can borrow at 5%. 
Instead, it means that lenders must expect a 5% return, after 
accounting for the risk of default. After all, corporate shareholders 
enjoy limited liability and even risk neutral lenders need more than 
5% interest to offset the chance that they would not be repaid.107 So, 
before Lend Co. lends $1 million to ABC Co. for one year, Lend Co. 
needs to expect a payment of $1,050,000. 
Now, suppose that ABC Co. would be capitalized solely with the 
loan from Lend Co. ABC Co. is considering a project that requires a 
$1 million investment, has a 50% chance of complete loss of the $1 
million, and a 50% chance of a return of the $1 million plus an 
additional $900,000. The cash flows from the project are as follows: 
TABLE II. 
Cash Flows from Project 
Year 1 $ (1,000,000) 
Year 2 50% Chance $ 0 
50% Chance $ 1,900,000 
Expected Value in Year 2 $ 950,000 
Lend Co. would not lend the money to ABC Co. without the federal 
loan guaranty. Even if Lend Co. could reap all of the returns from the 
project, it can expect to receive only $950,000. However, Lend Co. 
needs an expected payment of $1,050,000 to generate a 5% return. 
Lend Co.'s refusal to lend the $1 million is a good thing from the 
perspective of society. The project has an expected loss of 5%. 
Because the risk-free rate is 5%, there must be other, worthier 
projects that produce returns of at least 5%. Society is better off if 
Lend Co. finances those projects rather than the one ABC Co. 1s 
considering. 
107 Even without formal limits on liability, there would still be a risk of default. 
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In contrast, suppose the federal government guarantied the debt. 
Lend Co. is now perfectly willing to lend the $1 million as it is assured 
of repayment. The shareholders of ABC Co. are now on board as 
well and stand to make a handsome profit. If the project succeeds, 
they will make $850,000 (i.e., the $1,900,000 return minus the 
$1,050,000 payment of principal and interest to Lend Co.) If the 
project fails, they make or lose nothing and the federal government 
pays off Lend Co. Thus, the ABC Co. shareholders have an expected 
payment of $425,000 on the project. 
TABLE III. 
Cash Flows to Shareholders with Federal Guaranty 
Year 1 $ 0 
Year2 50% Chance $ 0 
50% Chance $850,000 
Expected Value in Year 2 $425,000 
But the federal guaranty has not made the project any better for 
society. It is the same loser that it was before. The guaranty has, 
however, made the project a winner for ABC Co. and Lend Co.108 
The guaranty burdens society in two ways. First, taxpayers must pay 
for the guaranty. In this example, the payment is $1,050,000 if the 
project fails. Second, scarce capital is being diverted into a risky and 
wasteful project. 
Moreover, the diversion benefits only the financially weak firms 
that are willing to give up the tax deduction in exchange for the 
guaranty. Strong companies with high marginal tax rates and low 
costs of borrowing will reject the guaranty. Companies with low 
marginal tax rates and high costs of borrowing will accept the 
guaranty. Federal loan guaranties allow the weakest companies to 
pursue overly risky, perhaps even wasteful, projects. They can be 
seen as a form of "lemon socialism,"109 subsidizing the least viable 
108 This is simply a variation of the well-known incentive that limited liability 
equity holders have to shift risk to their creditors. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 50 (1991). 
109 Cf. Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: 
From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 
1338 n.140 (1995) ("If socialism is a system of public ownership of the means of 
production, 'lemon socialism' refers to a system of government purchase and/or 
subsidy for unproductive or failing sectors of the economy. The government buys a 
lemon rather than nationalizing a Cadillac."); George Will, Hot Tubs and Cold 
Moralizing, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2006, at B7 (equating "lemon socialism" with "tax 
subsidies for failing businesses that the market says should fail"). The phrase has 
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firms in their pursuit of wasteful, risky investments. 
Of course, there are differences between a general loan guaranty 
and a pension guaranty. Companies cannot raise unlimited funds at 
zero transaction costs using their pension plans. The PBGC premiums 
have some relationship to risk and partial plan funding is required. 
Also, pension plans are subject to notoriously heavy regulation. 
Nonetheless, underfunded pension plans allow employers to finance a 
portion of their labor costs and less economically viable companies 
will underfund to take advantage of the subsidized PBGC guaranty. 
Underfunded pensions are government guarantied debt. Thus, the 
social cost of the PBGC guaranty is essentially the same as that of the 
guarantied commercial loan. Eliminating this lemon socialism 
through full funding is the subject of the next Part. 
IV. DESIGNING A FULL FUNDING REGIME 
A. Introduction 
Congress needs to revisit the pension funding and insurance rules 
to satisfy the risk-minimization and employer-internalization goals. 
There are three potential ways for ERISA to satisfy these goals: (1) 
greatly increasing the priority of the PBGC during employer 
bankruptcy or liquidation; (2) directing the PBGC to charge market-
based premiums; and (3) requiring full funding of plans. 
Some legal commentators have asserted that first-priority lien in 
bankruptcy would help solve the funding crisis.110 Then, so long as the 
employer had enough gross assets to satisfy its pension claims, funding 
and the PBGC guaranty would be irrelevant (although the PBGC 
would retain its role as debt collector). Other voluntary creditors 
could protect their interests by demanding that the employer fund its 
plan and secure its pension obligations. Such a system would 
doubtlessly impose transition costs on existing creditors who would 
see their existing priority fall behind the PBGC's. Without transition 
rules, the first-priority lien may violate the takings clause of the 
Constitution111 and effective transition rules may well be impossible to 
been attributed to John Kenneth Galbraith. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi 
Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24 
TRANSP. L.J. 73, 76 n.8 (1996). 
110 See Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 42, at 100-01; cf. Keating, Ten-Ton 
Monster, supra note at 60, passim (describing the low priority that the PBGC claims 
receive in bankruptcy). 
111 Cf, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29 (1991) ("[L]egislation might 
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draft into law. 
Another approach would be to allow the PBGC to charge market 
premiums for its guaranty. As a federal institution, the PBGC would 
face severe difficulties setting market prices for its premiums. The 
PBGC would be handicapped in pricing risk, which turns not only on 
funding levels but the credit quality of the employer. Even if the 
PBGC could price risk, it would need to do so on a case-by-case basis. 
The determinations would be made in agency hearings, not 
commercial negotiations. Effective funding reform should minimize 
the role of the PBGC, not expand it. 
Requiring private insurance would be problematic as well.112 
There is no history of private pension insurance in this country and it 
is unclear that any insurers would actually supply such a product. Of 
course, insurers would be willing to issue annuity contracts that pay 
benefits, but such contracts are simply another form of plan funding. 
The most difficult problem with private insurance would be 
keeping it from lapsing before bankruptcy. Consider, again, our 
stylized pension that pays a $1 million lump sum in ten years. It is 
currently unfunded, but guarantied by a private insurer under a policy 
that lasts for one year. Now, suppose that the employer hits financial 
difficulty, making bankruptcy very likely. There is no problem if the 
employer goes bankrupt in the next year while covered by the 
insurance. But, what if the employer is still distressed, but not yet 
bankrupt, after the insurance expires in one year? Since bankruptcy is 
very likely, the insurer will probably charge a premium that is almost 
the cost of full funding. Rather than paying this high premium, the 
employer might simply enter bankruptcy without pension insurance. 
Unless there is some mechanism to ensure that private insurance 
would be renewed, coverage could routinely lapse and violate the risk-
minimization goal. 
The remaining option is to require full funding and this approach 
is feasible. Congress has amended the rules several times, most 
recently with PP A 2006, and Congressional staff know how to draft 
funding standards and related transition rules. Focusing on the 
be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of 
parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is 
substantially disproportionate to the parties' experience."). 
112 Richard Ippolito has proposed a combination of PBGC reform and private 
insurance. He would have all plan sponsors belong to a common pool governed by a 
board elected by the plans. The board would set rates according to market principles, 
but plans could opt out if they buy private insurance. See Ippolito, supra note 29, at 
13-15. 
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funding standards would also minimize the role of federal regulators, 
as there would be no role for funding waivers or determining the 
creditworthiness of employers that have fully funded plans. 
Employers would, instead, rely on the existing actuarial profession to 
satisfy their obligations. Since plan funds are held in trust, past 
funding does not need to be renewed, as private insurance would. 
The remainder of this Part sketches a practicable system that would 
minimize funding shortfalls while respecting employer freedom. 113 
B. Measurement of Pension Assets and Liabilities 
The key to outlawing plan-funding shortfalls is an accurate, 
periodic measure of assets and liabilities at fair market value. The 
difference between asset and liability values represents the exposure 
that retirees and the PBGC have to employer default. Eliminating 
this exposure should be the goal of the funding rules. 
Valuing assets should be straightforward but has been obscured 
by the current funding rules. Subpart III.C.3 described the practice of 
smoothing. Rather than requiring current, fair market value for 
assets, the funding rules allow the use of historical averages calculated 
over the prior two to five years. But only current value describes the 
amount of assets available to satisfy claims. Historical prices are 
irrelevant to current values and to future returns. In other words, the 
market has no memory.114 The funding rules should forget historical 
prices as well. 
For similar reasons, the funding rules should forget past liabilities 
and interest rates. Current law allows employers to value liabilities 
using a historical average of interest rates. Historical prices tell us 
nothing about the current cost of funding or even the future of 
interest rate movements. Debt markets forget about historical 
interest rates and the funding rules should as well. 
Smoothing of assets and liabilities allows employers to avoid 
making contributions in response to volatility. But, such volatility has 
costs, which the employer-internalization goal places upon the 
employer.115 An abrupt fall in assets and rise in liabilities creates a 
real funding shortfall that needs to be remedied. The funding rules 
treat such shortfalls as aberrations that will pass, rather than breaches 
113 See Jeremy Gold, Never Again: A Transition to a Secure Private Pension 
System, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall2005, at 92. 
114 See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 349-
50 (8th ed. 2006). 
115 See Bader & Gold, supra note 5, at 9. 
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that may widen. Indeed, financial volatility is what moved the PBGC 
from surplus to deficit status at the beginning of this new century .116 
Thus, assets should be measured at current, fair market value and 
liabilities should be valued at an appropriate, current rate of interest. 
Part II.C discussed the idea of a "settlement rate," which is the 
discount rate that would be used if the employer tried to discharge its 
pension obligations. The correct settlement rate is subject to debate. 
If the risk-minimization goal is to be fully implemented, then 
employee pensions must be risk free. And, risk-free pensions must be 
valued according to the risk-free rate of return on Treasury bonds. 
However, current law does not make pensions completely risk 
free. Employees suffer default risk on benefits above the PBGC cap 
and the PBGC is not even backed by the federal government. 
Employers can also terminate plans by buying annuity contracts, 
which have some default risk. A new funding regime could possibly 
divide plan liabilities. Liabilities that are insured by the PBGC would 
be valued at the risk-free rate. Other liabilities would be valued at 
some higher but still conservative rate of interest. The yield on high-
. grade corporate bonds may be appropriate for this purpose. 
In summary, the funding rules should value assets and liabilities at 
current values rather than historical averages. This approach would 
identify shortfalls caused by volatility rather than allowing employers 
to hide them with smoothing rules.117 The details of valuing liabilities 
may require more study, but this Article suggests a bifurcation 
approach. All benefits guarantied by the PBGC would be discounted 
to present value using the risk-free rate on Treasury bonds. All other 
benefits would be discounted to present value using a conservative 
rate based on corporate bonds. 
C. Plan Funding and Investing 
The valuation described in the prior Part would occur annually 
and would expose any shortfalls in plan funding. Funding shortfalls 
may exist for several reasons: because the plan was never well funded 
in the first place; because of volatility of assets and liabilities; or 
because the employer amended the plan to grant new benefits. Under 
the proposal of this Article, the employer would be liable to fund the 
shortfalls immediately, regardless of their cause. The proposal would 
prohibit the amortization or waiver of funding shortfalls. 
116 See Bodie, supra note 76, at 325-26. 
117 See Bader & Gold, supra note 5. 
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Plan liabilities would also grow each year as covered employees 
perform more service and earn more compensation. The employer 
would need to forecast the present value of additional benefits that 
will accrue under the plan for the current year. Unless the plan was 
sufficiently overfunded, the employer would need to contribute an 
amount to pay for these additional accruals.118 As the proposal 
ensures that plans are fully funded on a current basis, past 
contributions over the minimum (i.e., credit balances) have no place 
in calculating actual contributions. 
The proposal of this Part allows employers and plan fiduciaries to 
retain their freedom over plan investments. Plan fiduciaries could 
continue to invest in equities, even though equity investments create a 
large mismatch between assets and liabilities. The only limit would be 
the existing rules on fiduciary investing from ERISA.119 
Equity investing by plans runs counter to financial theory, which 
suggests that employers should invest pension assets in a fixed-income 
portfolio rather than in equities.120 Plan investments in equities create 
financial volatility that exposes employees and the PBGC to risk of 
loss. Theoretically, equities do not create value for shareholders, 
because shareholders can buy their own equities on the market. 
It is tempting to require plans to comply with this theory. For 
better or for worse, however, the notion that equities are a suitable 
plan investment is firmly fixed in the world of pensions. Moreover, 
requiring investment in fixed-income securities could disrupt capital 
markets, causing a disruption in the investment strategies already 
mapped out for billions of dollars of assets. 
The proposal allows plans to cling to equity investments, but 
makes employers responsible for any resulting shortfall. Employers 
can continue to play the stock market, but would need to face margin 
calls for the full shortfall. Equity investing in particular can cause a 
mismatch between assets and liabilities. If the mismatch produces 
losses, the employer would need to make them up on an annual basis. 
If the mismatch produces gains, the gains would offset the need to 
make future contributions. The margin call, not regulation, protects 
against mismatches between assets and liabilities. If, however, the 
plan fails before it can make a margin call, the PBGC would still need 
to insure benefits, as discussed in the next Part. 
"
8 /d. at 9-10. 
ll9 For an overview, see LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 802-52. 
120 See SCHOLES ET AL. , supra note 51, at 264--67. 
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D. Insurance for Actuarial Mistakes and Short-Term Volatility 
Any reform requiring full funding would, as a practical matter, 
require a lengthy transition period (perhaps five or even ten years). 
After some point in the future, however, employers would need to 
have fully funded plans. The role of the PBGC as guarantor should 
diminish over the course of the transition but would not completely 
end. 
After the transition, the proposal of this Part leaves the PBGC 
with a reduced but continued role. 121 Employees would still face 
default risk from short-term fluctuations in assets and liabilities, from 
valuations of liabilities that fall short of actual experience, and from 
fraudulent behavior. Because the proposal strives to eliminate 
underfunding, claims against the PBGC would become extraordinary. 
There are even good reasons for the PBGC to become wholly 
supported by taxpayers under the proposal. Without systematic 
underfunding, the lemon socialism of the current PBGC guaranty 
disappears. Thus, the guaranty would have little or no impact on 
economic efficiency. If premiums were charged, they would almost 
certainly be flat-rate premiums. Such premiums do not reflect risk 
and do not further the employer-internalization goal. 
Public funding would also force Congress and the PBGC to 
become more vigilant watchdogs of pension funding. It is all too easy 
under the current arrangement for Congress to cut special deals for 
the worst risks with special funding rules and the like. The effects of 
those deals are pushed into the future and wished away by interposing 
the PBGC. Wishful thinking would be far harder if Congress needed 
to fund it with appropriations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Low-risk pensions minimize the default risks faced by employees. 
They do not bear any costs associated with default. Congress failed to 
assign these costs in a coherent manner under current law and PP A 
2006. Rather than assigning the appropriate cost to each employer, 
Congress has allowed it to rest, collectively, on financially strong 
employers. If the PBGC fails, the costs may end up resting on 
taxpayers in the future. The cure is a system of full funding, which 
would make each employer responsible for the costs of delivering low-
risk pensions to its own employees. 
121 See Bader, Unnecessary Evil, supra note 40, at 18. 
